While I find the idea of a major Tibetan “terrorist” attack extremely unlikely, it is possible that we have different definitions of terrorism. In a country without freedom of assembly or speech, a demonstration could be a “terrorist act.” But the one that left me the most befuddled was the idea that Taiwan would somehow do something provocative. And I asked my friend about that one. She conceded that was not too likely…but you never know. It is this state of constant potential threat that has served the government so well.

As this Economist article points out, even as Taiwanese-Mainland relations are set to improve, troubles still lurk, and China remains in a perpetual state of hyper-excitement of the thorny issue:

The probable meeting between [recently elected President of Taiwan] Siew and [Chinese President] Hu in the tropical city of Boao would be an easy first step in what is likely to be a difficult journey. China’s leaders, under pressure from rising nationalist sentiment stoked by the recent violence in Tibet, are unlikely to make big concessions on issues touching on questions of sovereignty. Few expect China to begin scaling back its huge military build-up on the coast facing Taiwan in the near future.

And isn’t that the whole point? China (i.e., the government) still has this bunker mentality. It’s a dangerous world out there, and you never know who might be out to get you. The Western media. The Japanese. Or the “big three” areas of constant “threat.” There is a fundamental problem with this dynamic: all of the threats are external. Even the “big three,” which are theoretically all internal issues, are essentially viewed as external threats. Two are outside of the Han center, and Taiwan is an external entity.

In the US, aside from the “evil Muslims” most of our created threats are internal: gays, the movie industry, the gun lobby, and the oil industry are all primary examples. This creates an entirely different dynamic, where people are negotiating within a legal structure to have their point of view rise to the top. In contrast, the Chinese dynamic is much more based on defining the Han identity by putting it in juxtaposition to others. (The concept of “China” does not really extend beyond the Han people in any meaningful way, much as the majority of Americans have only recently begun to view their country as substantively anything more than a “White” culture.)

All of this brings us back to the scourge of nationalism, which is particularly acute in China. When I was studying in South Africa, a political science professor used to tell my class that nationalism was a most vile evil that distorted the minds of otherwise rational people. Why else, he asked, would Chinese care about a “smoggy god-forsaken island like Taiwan?” He was joking, but only just barely.

An article in Slate from a couple of weeks ago makes almost an identical point:

Tibet is a remote, impoverished mountain region with little arable land. Why does China care so much about keeping it?

Nationalism. China invaded Tibet in 1950, but Beijing asserts that its close relationship with the region stretches back to the 13^th century, when first Tibet and then China were absorbed into the rapidly expanding Mongol empire. The Great Khanate, or the portion of the empire that contained China, Tibet, and most of East Asia, eventually became known as China’s Yuan Dynasty. Throughout the Yuan and the subsequent Ming and Qing dynasties, Tibet remained a subordinate principality of China, though its degree of independence varied over the centuries.

The main problem that has emerged is too many Chinese confuse ethnic pride (itself potentially dangerous) with blind support of unjust government policies. This is, of course, also a problem in the US and elsewhere, where too many right-wing politicians are all too eager to wrap themselves in the flag and claim moral superiority. However, in China the probably is particularly acute, since there are no real channels to voice opposition to government policies.

In America, for every Rush Limbaugh there is a Jon Stewart making fun of his self-righteousness. If prisoners are being tortured, pundits will criticize the policy–and the government. All camps have a voice, and the right to dismiss the others (or to listen).

In China this is not the case, as we all know. And it is not simply a function of a lack of political openness. There is a real sense that the Han culture is intrinsically linked to the government in a fundamental way. How can you attack a government if you fundamentally see it as an extension of yourself （even though it is not)?

I can remember my students in Chengdu used to marvel at the fact that a website was set up with the explicit purpose of comparing President Bush to a monkey (physically, although I’m sure other sites examining the mental capacities of the two animals would be equally compelling). It would be outrageous to make such a comparison in China, even though it is a juvenile and petty endeavor. If people cannot discuss something as insignificant as the fact that the commander in chief has a stunning resemblance to a monkey, how could real discussion possibly take place?

This is the People’s Republic of China, and the government has effectively convinced the population, on the whole, that this moniker is accurate. Why else would a population be so eager to stand up for policies that make the people look bad (at least in the eyes of some)? The brilliance of the Chinese Government is that it has convinced most Chinese people that they are somehow in this fight together against the dangerous outside world.

Once you have made this leap, it is easy to convince people that external forces that disagree with “the country’s” ideas are inherently a threat. And it is easy to stoke those fears at a time when the biggest international event in more than a generation is set to arrive in Beijing.

For the United States, the clearest way of expressing that support is to give full diplomatic recognition to the state that already exists and that the Ta1wanese overwhelmingly wish to preserve. Maintaining ambiguous, informal ties to Taiwan is confusing and potentially dangerous; it obscures Beijing’s understanding of just how committed the United States is to Taiwan’s defense and self-determination.

Recognition would bring stability and certainty, thus actually lowering the risks that Beijing will misinterpret the U.S. position and threaten or actually commence military action to regain Taiwan. Extending diplomatic recognition would no more prejudice the U.S.’ “one China” policy (itself an exercise in confusion and ambiguity) or the ultimate issue of reunification than did U.S. recognition of the two Germanys during the Cold War.

The really scary thing is that Bolton is so deluded, he actually thinks this is somehow a good idea. He somehow doesn’t see that the status quo, while awkward, keeps the region pretty safe. While there is occasional saber-rattling out of Beijing, it seems to be primarily for domestic consumption. It makes me wonder if he is actually trying to create a pretext for war with China, because otherwise it is hard to imagine how such a smart man could be so utterly stupid.

The other really scary thing is that Bolton’s analysis of the situation is actually pretty sharp through most of the article. He carefully argues that the overwhelming majority of Taiwanese support the status quo, and that the independence movement is a small minority, even with Chen Shui-bian having just been in office. And yet despite his general understanding of much of the situation, his conclusions make absolutely no sense. He argues for US official diplomatic recognition after saying:

Many in Europe and the U.S. have misinterpreted what Ma’s victory, combined with an earlier Nationalist Party win in national legislative elections, means for Taiwan’s future. It does not mean that Taiwan is shifting from pursuing independence from China to its very opposite, reunification with the mainland. Quite the contrary. Certainly, many Nationalists do hope for ultimate reunification. But Ta1wan’s political life is far more complicated than the simplistic dichotomy in many Western media reports.

Over the last several decades, there has been remarkable stability in the center of Taiwan’s politics. Faced with the options of reunification, independence or continuation of the status quo, substantial majorities of Taiwanese have chosen the status quo, at least for the foreseeable future. That status quo is that the island is a state — the Republic of China on Taiwan — that meets all the key customary international law criteria: a responsible government, a defined territory and a stable population.

In a 2007 survey of public opinion in Taiwan by Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council, 81.5% of respondents said they supported maintaining the status quo while deciding on reunification or independence at an unspecified future date. Only 10.2% wanted independence “as soon as possible,” and only 2.2% wanted reunification “as soon as possible.”

I don’t see how his argument lines up at all.

This is the same kind of arrogance that has gotten us into trouble elsewhere in the world. People thought that Iraqis would be delighted to have American occupiers because, to paraphrase Keith Hernandez, “We’re America.” As we all know it did not quite work out that way. Similarly Bolton thinks that the US is so singularly powerful that China will be utterly impotent to counteract such a move by the US.

China will not like this turn of events, but inevitably it will have little choice but to accept dual recognition. Now more than ever, the United States — and Europe and Japan — must be assertive in supporting a strengthening democracy in Taiwan.

Why now more than ever? In the piece he seems to be saying that it is particularly critical now because Taiwan’s economy is growing more slowly than other parts of Asia (although he concedes it is barreling ahead at 5.7%). That seems like a pretty good pace, especially considering that Taiwan’s economy is much more in line with South Korea, Hong Kong and Japan than Mainland China’s, which is far less developed overall, even today.

So at a time when the US economy is verging on a crisis, and Iraq and Afghanistan are stuck in quagmire, how could it possibly make sense to manufacture an international crisis where there isn’t one? Aren’t there enough problems in the world that the neocons don’t need to invent one? Unless they are trying to invent a war that some argue the neocons were originally hoping for before the events of September 11, 2001. Don’t believe me? Maybe you’ll believe this:

The same top Bush administration neoconservatives who leap-frogged Washington’s foreign policy establishment to topple Saddam Hussein nearly pulled off a similar coup in U.S.-China relations—creating the potential of a nuclear war over Taiwan, a top aide to former Secretary of State Colin Powell says.

Lawrence B. Wilkerson, the U.S. Army colonel who was Powell’s chief of staff through two administrations, said in little-noted remarks early last month that “neocons” in the top rungs of the administration quietly encouraged Taiwanese politicians to move toward a declaration of independence from mainland China — an act that the communist regime has repeatedly warned would provoke a military strike.

This is something for every American to consider when they enter the voting booth this fall.

I’m glad you asked that! As it turns out, Chinese Taipei has a special flag during the Olympics. It represents neither Taiwan nor Mainland China, but rather Imaginary Land. What a fantastic compromise! How did all of this come about? Again, glad you asked!

Here is what the Chinese Olympic Committee, which sadly identifies itself as “COC” and has the word “Chinese” misspelled at the very top of their website, has to say on Taiwan’s Olympic participation:

The COC representatives reaffirmed the basic principle at the meeting: There is only one China in the world, and that is the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan is part of Chinese territory. Based on this principle, the IOC should recognize only one NOC for China, and that is the Chinese Olympic Committee with its headquarters in Beijing and representing the amateur athletes of the whole country.

However, in consideration of the actual situation in Taiwan and in order that the athletes there would have the opportunity to take part in international competitions, the COC agreed that the sports organization in Taiwan might stay in the IOC, on condition that it would not attach “Republic of China” to its name, nor use the appellation of “Taiwan” independently. Nor would it be allowed to use its “national flag” and “national anthem” and anything symbolic of the “Republic of China.” The COC’s approach was considered realistic and acceptable to many IOC members.

Okay, you are saying, they don’t get their own flag, but how did they end of with this concoction? Here is the partial explanation from the World Games website (they also cite “COC”!):

When athletes from Taiwan carried their flag onto the stage for the opening ceremony of the 2004 Summer Olympics in Athens, Greece, they marched with other countries that began with the letter ‘T.’ Officially, they did not represent Taiwan, they represented ‘Chinese Taipei.’

The athletes did not carry the flag of the Republic of China (ROC), which had been used in Olympic Games up until the 1970s, but rather the official Chinese Taipei Olympic flag sanctioned by the International Olympic Committee. This flag is white with a blue and red outline of a five-pedaled flower, wrapped around a small white sun enclosed in a blue background–the symbol found on the ROC flag–with the five Olympic rings below.

China is not the only countrie(s) to have embraced creative methods when trying to project a national identity to the world. You may remember North and South Korean athletes walked together in the Sydney opening ceremony, and then promptly had 639 round of Six-Party Talks. (Shouldn’t they be five parties? I mean there’s only one Korea, right?)

These examples have recently re-surfaced as other countries are beginning to examine the role fiction and bogus flags can play in the world’s premier sporting event. The movement toward wishful thinking among the world’s leaders has been dubbed as “The Olympic Spirit.”

Only this year Germany petitioned the IOC to have Great Britain, France and Holland participate in the Games under the German red, black and yellow. Similarly, Spain is hopeful that South America will participate under the name “Western Spanish Territories.”

Where does America weigh in on this one? One World, One Flag.

The popular notion among people in this country is that China is not ready for elections. That might be true to a certain degree. Most people would be skeptical that a ballot would be either secret or counted properly after a long history of government ‘shenanigans’ (that’s a euphemism, folks). However, the Chinese media widely covers Taiwanese elections, even if they slant the stories, and they have full coverage of other important democracies as well. At some point must the average person not think, “Why the hell can’t we do this if Serbia can?” And then in their collective head they repeat, “Serbia! For Christ’s sake!”

Most people in China have the mindset that the Communist autocracy will indefinitely be the system, for better or worse, and there’s not much point in yelling about it. But it seems difficult for me to imagine that the average person doesn’t start to wonder, at some point, why so many, uh, not very impressive (again, euphemism) countries are able to have democratic elections, while China, the 21st century’s great hope, is still stuck in an embarrassingly backwards system.

Is it possible that Chinese simply see the country as such a unique case that all of the democratic movements around them don’t matter? Or is it a country that has accepted its fate as a modern, institutionalized dictatorship?