Does the Central Government Run China?
In the LA Times today, Francis Fukuyama argues that the greatest tyranny in China today is local, rather than the central, government. While his argument is essentially correct, it also oversimplifies the picture and implicitly absolves the country’s top leaders of their role in the country’s ills, while at the same time misunderstanding the uniqueness of the modern Chinese situation.
Mr. Fukuyama is astute, if hardly groundbreaking, in his assertions that many of the most local leaders are the most ruthless, and also that the central government is generally too weak to control their outrageous behavior. Whereas many in the West think of China as having a Stalinist top-down leadership structure, the truth, of course, is that while Beijing may (or may not) orchestrate major crackdowns in places like Tibet, they are often unaware or not powerful enough to control small local governments in, say, Hunan. Fukuyama writes:
The vast majority of abuses against the rights of ordinary Chinese citizens — peasants who have their land taken away without just compensation, workers forced to labor under sweatshop conditions or villagers poisoned by illegal dumping of pollutants — occur at a level far below that of the government in Beijing.
China’s peculiar road toward modernization after 1978 was powered by “township and village enterprises” — local government bodies given the freedom to establish businesses and enter into the emerging market economy. These entities were enormously successful, and many have become extraordinarily rich and powerful…
The central government, by all accounts, would like to crack down on these local government bodies but is unable to do so. It both lacks the capacity to do this and depends on local governments and the private sector to produce jobs and revenue.
The argument is sound, and ironically few Chinese would be likely to defend local government officials in China I suspect (although please feel free to prove me wrong). Yet Fukuyama gets weighed down in making analogies to Europe of old:
The 19th century British legal scholar Sir Henry Sumner Maine, in his book “Early Law and Custom,” pointed to this very fact in a fine essay titled “France and England.” He notes that the single most widespread complaint written in the cahiers produced on the eve of the French Revolution were complaints by peasants over encroachments of their property rights by seigneurial courts. According to Maine, judicial power in France was decentralized and under the control of the local aristocracy.
Seems like a better example would have been China, two hundred (or five hundred) years ago. China has always been highly decentralized in its power, owing greatly to its enormousness. Yet at a more fundamental level, placing the blame on local officials absolves the central government of much of its responsibility. While it’s true that Beijing does not want rogue local officials terrorizing Chinese citizens, it also has shown little desire to step into disputes unless absolutely forced. In other words, it wants things to be better, it just has little interest in facilitating certain types of change.
Fukuyama seems to miss a fundamental point in his essay, in which the main point seems to be that the ills of Chinese governance come from the powerlessness of Beijing rather than its strength, because “state weakness can hurt the cause of liberty.” He implies that were it not for the central government’s weakness, it would likely be cracking down on local shenanigans. But that is highly unlikely, at least on a wide scale.
On the one hand, the Chinese central leadership seems to have little interest in promoting “liberty.” Such interference in local affairs would immediately connect the country’s top leadership with local conditions. Why would it want that? Isn’t it better to be able to blame local problems on local corruption than taken responsibility at the top?
On the other hand, Beijing is also promoting some of the policies that encourages disregard for the environment and certain types of human rights. Namely, the overwhelming importance of local economic growth over all other considerations. By making “economic development” the singular measure for governmental success, there is an inherent incentive not to protect the environment or workers’ rights. It is in the interest of everyone in power to develop at any cost. And frequently those costs can be tremendous.
In the end Fukuyama’s argument is not really about analyzing what is really going on in China today, but rather telling a broader historical narrative: decentralized governments are more dangerous than centralized power. The problem is that he has correctly identified China as partially fitting into that storyline, but failed to fully address the modern day realities. History does not repeat itself, as Mr. Fukuyama seems to believe (now that we’re no longer at the end of history), instead history’s reflections can be seen in current events. But these reflections are less like those in mirror, clear and precise, and more like those in a lake being distorted by the rippling waters.
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Larry responds:
Posted: April 30th, 2008 at 11:24 am →
“China has always been highly decentralized in its power, owing greatly to its enormousness.” That’s not quite true. Some dynasties were decentralized by design, and others were defacto decentralized, or, they thought they were centralized. I think the current situation is “Zhongnanhai says it runs the country.” Individual officials just find ways to get around that.
Paul responds:
Posted: April 30th, 2008 at 1:42 pm →
Josh, well written and thought out. I agree with all of what you’re saying. The one thing I might add to the mix, if I may, is that Beijing’s reluctance sometimes to crack down on local officials for misdeeds is somewhat inherent in the Cadre managment system. This country may be governed by a one-party system, but this country is run by the ‘guanxi system.’ Because of the large bureaucracy, there has developed a vast tapestry of favors, back scratching and factional intermingling that might lead Beijing, at times, to be more concerned about pissing off the wrong group more than it might be at rooting out problem officials.
nanheyangrouchuan responds:
Posted: April 30th, 2008 at 3:08 pm →
When there is an open clash between local Chinese and local governments, the provinces and Beijing first crush the protest, then sacrifice a few local officials who made the CCP look bad and don’t have enough connections in Beijing or enough dirt on high level CCP officials to defend themselves.
Then there is the PLA/PAP, which is an organ of power unto itself and is the real power in China. The CCP would disintegrate were it not for the PLA’s backing.
Shaan responds:
Posted: April 30th, 2008 at 7:49 pm →
Economic development is the defining indicator of progress in China, but the underlying goal is social stability–to that end, the Chinese government will do whatever it takes to maintain it. I think that is in line with what you’re saying, but it’s also worth noting that the central government will step in when punishing a local government will maintain stability, or at least cause less destabilization than taking no action would. So in a way, if enough people make a big enough fuss against their city/provincial government, that government will almost certainly take the fall.
cathy responds:
Posted: May 5th, 2008 at 1:35 am →
Depending on the riots the people cause, local govt would use crackdown, central govt don’t go into villages to clean up corruptions unless enough villages all band together. And that’s what CCP afraid to see when mass have riots and protests, their first reaction is to crackdown, as a knee jerked reaction. There are so many layers of corruption officials in China, the local officials have so much money since the economic booms, they are like local aristocrats back in the old days in Europe.