Cup of Cha
This is China

If you had any doubts that the Chinese media campaign to convince its population that there are three threats to the stability of China (Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang) is working, let me dispel those notions. Recently I was chatting with a 20-something, highly-educated Chinese friend of mine about the Olympics. She said she was looking forward to them, but that the one fear she had was terrorists. I asked what types of terrorists would likely strike Beijing during the Games, and she replied, in order, Tibetans, Taiwanese and Xinjiangers (is that the right word?).

While I find the idea of a major Tibetan “terrorist” attack extremely unlikely, it is possible that we have different definitions of terrorism. In a country without freedom of assembly or speech, a demonstration could be a “terrorist act.” But the one that left me the most befuddled was the idea that Taiwan would somehow do something provocative. And I asked my friend about that one. She conceded that was not too likely…but you never know. It is this state of constant potential threat that has served the government so well.

As this Economist article points out, even as Taiwanese-Mainland relations are set to improve, troubles still lurk, and China remains in a perpetual state of hyper-excitement of the thorny issue:

The probable meeting between [recently elected President of Taiwan] Siew and [Chinese President] Hu in the tropical city of Boao would be an easy first step in what is likely to be a difficult journey. China’s leaders, under pressure from rising nationalist sentiment stoked by the recent violence in Tibet, are unlikely to make big concessions on issues touching on questions of sovereignty. Few expect China to begin scaling back its huge military build-up on the coast facing Taiwan in the near future.

And isn’t that the whole point? China (i.e., the government) still has this bunker mentality. It’s a dangerous world out there, and you never know who might be out to get you. The Western media. The Japanese. Or the “big three” areas of constant “threat.” There is a fundamental problem with this dynamic: all of the threats are external. Even the “big three,” which are theoretically all internal issues, are essentially viewed as external threats. Two are outside of the Han center, and Taiwan is an external entity.

In the US, aside from the “evil Muslims” most of our created threats are internal: gays, the movie industry, the gun lobby, and the oil industry are all primary examples. This creates an entirely different dynamic, where people are negotiating within a legal structure to have their point of view rise to the top. In contrast, the Chinese dynamic is much more based on defining the Han identity by putting it in juxtaposition to others. (The concept of “China” does not really extend beyond the Han people in any meaningful way, much as the majority of Americans have only recently begun to view their country as substantively anything more than a “White” culture.)

All of this brings us back to the scourge of nationalism, which is particularly acute in China. When I was studying in South Africa, a political science professor used to tell my class that nationalism was a most vile evil that distorted the minds of otherwise rational people. Why else, he asked, would Chinese care about a “smoggy god-forsaken island like Taiwan?” He was joking, but only just barely.

An article in Slate from a couple of weeks ago makes almost an identical point:

Tibet is a remote, impoverished mountain region with little arable land. Why does China care so much about keeping it?

Nationalism. China invaded Tibet in 1950, but Beijing asserts that its close relationship with the region stretches back to the 13^th century, when first Tibet and then China were absorbed into the rapidly expanding Mongol empire. The Great Khanate, or the portion of the empire that contained China, Tibet, and most of East Asia, eventually became known as China’s Yuan Dynasty. Throughout the Yuan and the subsequent Ming and Qing dynasties, Tibet remained a subordinate principality of China, though its degree of independence varied over the centuries.

The main problem that has emerged is too many Chinese confuse ethnic pride (itself potentially dangerous) with blind support of unjust government policies. This is, of course, also a problem in the US and elsewhere, where too many right-wing politicians are all too eager to wrap themselves in the flag and claim moral superiority. However, in China the probably is particularly acute, since there are no real channels to voice opposition to government policies.

In America, for every Rush Limbaugh there is a Jon Stewart making fun of his self-righteousness. If prisoners are being tortured, pundits will criticize the policy–and the government. All camps have a voice, and the right to dismiss the others (or to listen).

In China this is not the case, as we all know. And it is not simply a function of a lack of political openness. There is a real sense that the Han culture is intrinsically linked to the government in a fundamental way. How can you attack a government if you fundamentally see it as an extension of yourself （even though it is not)?

I can remember my students in Chengdu used to marvel at the fact that a website was set up with the explicit purpose of comparing President Bush to a monkey (physically, although I’m sure other sites examining the mental capacities of the two animals would be equally compelling). It would be outrageous to make such a comparison in China, even though it is a juvenile and petty endeavor. If people cannot discuss something as insignificant as the fact that the commander in chief has a stunning resemblance to a monkey, how could real discussion possibly take place?

This is the People’s Republic of China, and the government has effectively convinced the population, on the whole, that this moniker is accurate. Why else would a population be so eager to stand up for policies that make the people look bad (at least in the eyes of some)? The brilliance of the Chinese Government is that it has convinced most Chinese people that they are somehow in this fight together against the dangerous outside world.

Once you have made this leap, it is easy to convince people that external forces that disagree with “the country’s” ideas are inherently a threat. And it is easy to stoke those fears at a time when the biggest international event in more than a generation is set to arrive in Beijing.

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Tags: han, nationalist, t1bet, taiwan, tibet, xinjiang
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