Does China Really Control its Army?
A few days ago I wrote about the possibilty of income inequality undermining Chinese stability since the gap is comparable now to what it was just before the Red Army overthrew the Guomindang. One interesting response was from a reader only identified as ‘Larry’ (although we know he’s a retired IT guy). He argued that the PRC has control over their army in a way that the Nationalists did not, and this could undercut a potential upheaval:
ROC had never had control of the army. When ROC was formed, the army was owned by various local warlords. None of them would listen to the central government. This persisted from 1911, and had never been rectified. In 1945, ROC just finished the war with Japan. The country was in ruins. And the army was fragmented as usual. The PLA of the CPC had grown by leaps and bounds during the war and was ready to continue the revolution it had started.
So, ROC was weaken by the war to begin with, have no effective control of the army at the time.
This is a very valid point, and I should mention that I never said inequality would cause a revolution. On the contrary my point was that it was something to keep an eye on, and even argued that environmental issues could be more of a threat.
Nonetheless, Larry’s comments came just after I read a piece in the Economist questioning his very premise, namely that the PRC has full control over its army. The article cites major problems with retired soldiers who have trouble readjusting to society without the benefit of the SOE system to reabsorb them. It says:
Over the past couple of years protests by demobilised soldiers have become a potent challenge to local governments trying to keep the lid on unrest during a period of wrenching social and economic change. The unrest has embarrassed the ruling Communist Party…
Most soldiers from towns are assigned jobs in the civilian sector when they leave the army. But this has become increasingly difficult because of the dismantling of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in recent years and the resentment of surviving SOEs at having ex-soldiers foisted on them. Rural soldiers—the bulk of the non-officer ranks—are being sent back to villages where there is next to nothing to do…
In early September apparently co-ordinated unrest broke out in at least three cities in other provinces. Hundreds of ex-soldiers rampaged through centres run by the Ministry of Railways where they were undergoing training.
Obviously this presents an interesting and difficult situation. These ex-servicemen feed directly into the inequality dynamic seen throughout society. They tend to be poor and from the countryside, but they are also well aware that many of their countrymates are getting rich. After they have served their government, many clearly feel that China is taking them for granted and ignoring their problems.
It still sees unlikely that this would somehow spark anything more than isolated incidents, but with armed, trained men in a state of discontent, Chinese officials must stay up late worrying.
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chriswaugh_bj responds:
Posted: November 14th, 2007 at 7:40 pm →
“but with armed, trained men in a state of discontent”
Germany of 1918/1919?
Larry responds:
Posted: November 15th, 2007 at 1:59 am →
The retired soldiers are not armed. They are trained, but undernourished and old. Control of those in active duty are much more important.
Chinese revolutions were typically started by young students. It is the unemployed and underemployed college grads that the Chinese government should be worried about. Especially those with good organizational and communication skills.
And China has a history of foreign trained college grads leading revolutions. Those returnees from the west are the greatest danger.
Josh responds:
Posted: November 15th, 2007 at 7:32 am →
Good point, shouldn’t have said armed.